BACKGROUND
Adverse drug events (ADEs) represent a major cause of harm in healthcare. [1] [2] [3] [4] Many ADEs are preventable, [5] [6] [7] and computerized provider order entry (CPOE) with clinical decision support (CDS) reduces the frequency of ADEs. 8, 9 Preventable ADEs have myriad causes, including prescribing medications that a patient is allergic to, prescribing nephrotoxic drugs in the setting of renal dysfunction, making dosing errors, or prescribing multiple interacting drugs. 6 Numerous CDS systems have been implemented to reduce harm from each of these causes, but the most widely used type of CDS is drug-drug interaction (DDI) checking. 10, 11 DDI checking has reduced the rate of ADEs and is a critical tool to support safe prescribing in electronic health records (EHRs). 9, [12] [13] [14] Use of DDI checking is also a certification and attestation requirement in all three stages of the United States Meaningful Use incentive program for EHRs. 15 A DDI is considered present when one drug alters the effects of another. Some DDIs cause ADEs that would not have occurred if either of the drugs had been prescribed by itself. Mechanisms for drug interactions may include pharmacokinetic interactions, where Bone drug affects the absorption, distribution, metabolism, or excretion of anotherâ nd pharmacodynamic interactions, where Btwo drugs have additive or antagonistic pharmacologic effects.^1 6 Automated DDI checking in EHRs checks medication orders against a list of known DDIs and alerts clinicians when they prescribe two drugs together that are on the list of known DDIs. At the extremes-the most severe and least severe DDIs-there is consensus about which are important and unimportant. 17, 18 However, for many of the DDIs in between, there is no broad consensus about their level of importance or which ones merit alerts. Various commercial knowledge bases cataloging potential DDIs are available, but there is little agreement about the drug pairs to include, and there is a paucity of primary literature supporting many purported interactions.
designed by a team of pharmacists and physicians. 21 Compared to most commercially available drug knowledge bases as typically installed, the homegrown BWH knowledge base triggers alerts much less frequently. The alerting system, which was built into BWH's legacy EHRs, the Longitudinal Medical Record (LMR) and the Brigham Integrated Computer System, strongly differentiates between various severity tiers for DDIs; for example, contraindicated drug pairs could not be ordered at all, while the least severe interactions were informational and did not interrupt workflow. 20 BWH recently adopted the Epic commercial EHR system (Verona, WI). In this study, we evaluated the effect of the transition from our internally developed LMR to our implementation of Epic on DDI alerting behavior during medication order entry, including alert burden, acceptance rate, and alert fatigue. All evaluation and discussion of Epic in this paper applies to the specific implementation of Epic at BWH, which may differ from Epic implementations at other institutions.
METHODS
BWH transitioned from LMR to Epic on May 31, 2015. As part of the transition, BWH switched from using a highly tailored DDI knowledge base to a widely used commercial knowledge base from First Databank produced by Hearst Corporation (South San Francisco, CA) with minimal customization. This is a frequently used approach-typically with the implementation of commercial EHRs; one of several commercial drug knowledge bases sold by third parties is selected and used. Figure 1 shows the strongly tiered alerting system that was used in LMR, and the three tiers are described in Table 1 . Figure 2 shows the weakly tiered alerting system that is used in the Epic implementation at BWH. Although both systems use three tiers of drugs, the drugs contained in each tier differ, and the difference in alerting between tiers is less strong in Epic than in LMR. In our implementation of Epic, all DDI alerts are interruptive regardless of tier and may be overridden if desired, with room for an optional override reason. Unlike in LMR (where users were prohibited from ordering the most severe drug combinations while the least severe combinations resulted in only a passive alert), Epic at BWH does not use hard stops (which make co-prescription of interacting drugs impossible) or passive alerts. Thus, the severity of tiers in Epic is differentiated only by color, icon, and label.
Additionally, placement of DDI alerts within provider workflow changed significantly with Epic (see Fig. 2 ). While DDIs were shown as soon as a medication was selected in LMR, in Epic as implemented at BWH, the DDI alerts are shown in one batch at the time of signing. Thus, in LMR, providers see the alert at the beginning of the ordering process, while in Epic, providers see the alert at the end of the ordering process. The result is that, in our implementation of Epic, users may see many medication alerts at once, since multiple orders can be signed at the same time, and the DDI alerting checks all the pairs at once. Furthermore, in our implementation of Epic, users may override all alerts with a single click-there is no requirement to review or interact with each alert separately, as was required in LMR.
We extracted data on outpatient medication orders and alert firing and acceptance in LMR from our enterprise data warehouse from November 28, 2014, to May 29, 2015-the last 6 months that LMR was used at BWH. We also extracted outpatient Epic data from June 1, 2015, to November 30, 2015-the first 6 months that Epic was used. Although Epic is used in both the inpatient and outpatient setting, we limited our analysis to outpatient alerts because LMR was used only in the outpatient setting. BWH employed a Bbig bang^ap-proach to the system implementation, converting all outpatient clinics and inpatient areas on the same day. Because we transitioned from LMR to Epic on a Sunday morning, we excluded the Saturday and Sunday surrounding the cutover.
We defined alert burden as the number of alerts per 100 orders, and we defined clinician acceptance rate as the proportion of DDI alerts leading to either the cancelation of the proposed drug order or discontinuation of the incumbent interacting drug. Note that we did not attempt to assess the appropriateness of the clinical response to the DDI alert. For example, while many less severe DDI drug pairs may be safely prescribed so long as the patient is monitored, we did not attempt to include monitoring in our definition of alert acceptance. Additionally, we did not attempt to control for instances where a user accepted or overrode an alert but, in practice did something else, either by continuing to prescribe a drug after accepting an alert or temporarily discontinuing a drug after overriding an alert. We looked only at the action the user took on the DDI alert itself to evaluate the impact of the two different alerting systems.
We compared the alert burden and the alert acceptance rates in the last 6 months of LMR use to the first 6 months of Epic use. We compared alerts overall, by tier, and for the most commonly alerted drug pairs in each system. As described in the BResults^section, our leadership disabled Tier 3 alerting in Epic on March 1, 2016, so we were also able to further analyze alert fatigue by comparing alert burden and acceptance rates before and after this change. This analysis was done using a separate time period, using August 31, 2015, through February 29, 2016 , as the Bbefore^period, and March 2, 2016, through August 31, 2016, as the Bafter^period. Figure 3 , the number of interruptive DDI alerts (which included Tiers 1 and 2 in LMR, and all three tiers during the initial period in Epic) increased substantially after the switch to Epic, while total volume of medication orders stayed about the same. Because each system logs edits to medication orders and refills differently, the medication volume is similar but not exactly comparable between systems. It does however suggest that prescription volumes were not substantially different after the switch from LMR to Epic. In the final 6 months of LMR, there were approximately 2 interruptive DDI alerts per 100 orders, while in the first 6 months of Epic implementation, there were about 11 interruptive DDI alerts per 100 orders. Both systems also display many other types of medication alerts, including warnings for high and low doses, drug and therapeutic duplication, potential drug-allergy issues and pregnancy, geriatric and pediatric precautions. In LMR, DDI alerts comprised 19.2% of all medication alerts, leading to a total alert burden of about 9 medication alerts per 100 medication orders. In our instance of Epic, DDI alerts comprised about 29.8% of all medication alerts, leading to a total alert burden of about 36 medication alerts per 100 medication orders.
RESULTS

As shown in
The acceptance rate for interruptive DDI alerts overall (Tiers 1 and 2 in LMR and Tiers 1, 2, and 3 in Epic) fell from 30.7% in LMR to 6.2% in Epic (P < 0.001 using Pearson's chi-squared test for independence). A comparison is not possible for Tier 3 because these alerts were passive in LMR. Comparing only Tiers 1 and 2 in each system, the overall acceptance rate fell from 30.7% in LMR to 7.6% in Epic (P < 0.001). As shown in Figure 4 , the acceptance rate fell for DDIs in both Tiers 1 and 2. One possible explanation for this substantial drop in DDI acceptance is that many less Lower severity interactions
Rather than displaying an interruptive Bpop upâ lert, information about the potential interaction is shown at the top of the ordering screen, and no response from the user is required (or possible).
• Omeprazole and voriconazole (may lead to increased levels and toxicity of voriconazole important DDI alerts are shown by Epic and that these alerts are more likely to be overridden. This is certainly true, given that the knowledge base paired with Epic is much larger than the knowledge base paired with LMR. However, if this were the only cause, then we would expect identical pairs of interacting drugs that are present in both databases to have similar override rates in Epic and LMR. To explore this explanation, we looked at key identical DDI pairs in both systems to compare acceptance rates (shown in Table 2 ). The three most common Tier 1 (most severe) alerts that fired in LMR were for ciprofloxacin and tizanidine, 26 clarithromycin and simvastatin, 27, 28 , and erythromycin and simvastatin. 28 These alerts were accepted 100% of the time in LMR by design, but only 21.6, 18.0, and 15.6% of the time, respectively, in Epic. When we evaluated Tier 2 DDIs, which are presented more similarly in Epic and LMR (i.e., they are interruptive but can be overridden in both systems), we found significant differences between clinician responses in the two systems. The three most common Tier 2 (medium severity) DDIs in LMR were citalopram and omeprazole 29 which fell from 29.6% acceptance in LMR to 8.9% in Epic, amlodipine and simvastatin 30 which fell from 20.6 to 5.8%, and ciprofloxacin and warfarin 31 which fell from 31.7 to 17.9%. Given the substantial drop in acceptance rates for DDI alerts, the Partners HealthCare CDS Committee hypothesized that the increased alert burden, particularly of Tier 3 alerts, contributed to alert fatigue and the lower acceptance of Tier 1 and 2 alerts. The Committee decided to filter Tier 3 alerts so they would not be displayed unless specifically requested by the user. This change was implemented on March 1, 2016, and represents a natural experiment in alert fatigue. After the change, the interruptive DDI alert burden in Epic fell by 50.5%, as shown in Figure 3 . Including other types of medication alerts (such as allergy or pregnancy), the total medication alert burden decreased from about 35 medication alerts per 100 orders to about 28 medication alerts per 100 orders in the 6 months before and after Tier 3 DDI alerts were disabled. After the change, Tier 1 alert acceptance rose from 9.1 to 12.7%, while Tier 2 acceptance rose from 6.9 to 9.2%. Though modest, these differences were statistically significant in both tiers using Pearson's chi-squared test for independence (P < 0.01 for Tier 1 and P < 0.001 for Tier 2).
DISCUSSION
We found a sixfold increase in the interruptive DDI alert firing rate when converting from a legacy system with a highly tailored drug knowledge base to a commercial system with a standard commercially available knowledge base. Even after disabling Tier 3 alerts, there were still almost three times as many interruptive DDI alerts in Epic as in LMR. This increase in alert burden was associated with a much higher override rate by providers. The increase in overrides was seen across severity Alert acceptance rates in LMR and Epic, by severity tier. Since the systems use different knowledge bases, the drugs contained in each tier differ according to the system. Acceptance rates are given as a percentage with the denominator in the axis label. The difference between rates in Tier 1 is statistically significant structurally with P = 0.0. The difference between acceptance rates in Tier 2 is statistically significant with P < 0.001 using Pearson's chi-squared test for independence.
levels, but particularly affected the most serious interactions, representing an important safety concern. The override rate for even the most severe warnings was about nine out of ten.
Factors Potentially Contributing to the Drop in Acceptance Rate
There are several possible explanations for the drop in interruptive DDI alert acceptance rates after this transition. First, interruptive DDI alerts fired 5.5 times more frequently in our initial implementation of Epic than they did in LMR. If a larger proportion of the Epic alerts are less clinically important, users may override a greater number of them appropriately, leading to an overall reduction in acceptance rate, even though users are still complying with clinically appropriate DDI alerts. This explanation probably plays a role in the overall acceptance rates, as the knowledge base used in LMR is smaller than that used in our implementation of Epic. However, given that acceptance rates also fell for identical drug pairs from LMR to Epic, including pairs in the most severe tier that an expert panel had deemed Bnever^interactions, this does not fully explain our observed results. A second possibility is that the increased number of alerts may reduce acceptance rates by causing alert fatigue. 17, 32 Under one common conceptualization of alert fatigue, a high volume of DDI alerts distracts users from noticing more clinically important DDIs in a frequency-dependent fashion: as the number of less important alerts increases, the odds of missing a more important alert should increase. We explored this possibility with our natural experiment and found that reducing the interruptive DDI alert burden by more than half resulted in a modest increase in acceptance rates for the remaining alerts, lending support to this formulation of alert fatigue. Under another definition of alert fatigue, in addition to simply distracting users with noise, the increased number of alerts may also negatively affect users' perceptions of the reliability of the alerting system. As mistrust in the validity of alerts increases, users may begin to devote less attention to alerts or ignore them entirely. Once credibility is lost, users may disregard even the most important alerts. [33] [34] [35] In this scenario, decreasing alert burden after credibility has already been lost may not be enough to regain users' trust. Evaluating this hypothesis will require further study.
A third potential reason is that other aspects of the interface or workflow affect alert acceptance. There were many differences in workflow between the two systems:
1. LMR alerts behaved differently based on tier. Tier 1 alerts were hard stops, Tier 2 alerts were interruptive with required override reason, and Tier 3 alerts were non-interruptive. This tiering was designed to focus users on the most severe DDI alerts (which they could not override), while deemphasizing the least severe. Based on results from a prior study of tiered DDI alerts in LMR, 36 we believe that workflow differences (particularly the difference in tiering) likely play the most significant role in the drop in acceptance rates. The first version of LMR, like Epic, presented all three tiers of DDIs interruptively and required an override reason for all tiers. When tiering was added to LMR, acceptance rates increased from 34 to 100% for Tier 1 alerts (due to the hard stop that prevented co-prescription of both drugs) and from 10 to 29% for Tier 2 alerts. 36 This dramatic change in acceptance rates after tiering is consistent with our experience in Epic, which moved in the opposite direction, strongly supporting the hypothesis that the lack of differentiation among tiers in Epic is a major driver of the overall drop in alert acceptance rates.
Implications
Our study has several important implications. First, it suggests that changing from a highly tailored DDI alerting system to a more general one as part of an EHR conversion can decrease the acceptance rate of DDI alerts and increase alert burden on users. Second, it provides a quantification of the impact of alert fatigue. Though alert fatigue has been described frequently in the literature, it has not previously been quantified experimentally. Our data from before and after Tier 3 suppression in Epic suggests that the effects of alert fatigue are real but, in our case, outweighed by other differences.
Strengths and Limitations
A key strength of our study is the before-after design at one institution, suggesting that the observed changes in alert burden and acceptance rates were due to the change in the EHR rather than population change. Further, the natural experiment and prior data comparing tiered and non-tiered alerting allow for a comprehensive analysis of potential underlying causes of these changes, including a novel quantification of the effect of alert fatigue. Our study also has several limitations. First, it was done only at a single site, and with a single commercial EHR-further study with other systems would be informative. Second, it looks at only the initial 1-year period after implementation of the new commercial EHR system; alert acceptance may still increase or decrease after a longer period of stabilization (although as of 2-year post-implementation, there is no trend in the data to suggest that this will spontaneously happen). Third, the study does not investigate ADE rates before and after the change in system and thus does not provide a direct measure of the change on patient outcomes. Fourth, there were a number of differences between the EHR user interfaces, and we did not attempt to study each feature separately. A randomized trial of different alerting features (including tiering, workflow, user interface, and knowledge base) would be the gold standard for determining the relative contribution of each of these features. Finally, there were artifacts in the data we were unable to explain, such as changes in the number of alerts that fired for a single drug pair. Despite these limitations, the increase in alert burden and reduction in alert acceptance is quite substantial.
CONCLUSION
In summary, understanding the effects of alert design and alert fatigue for DDI and other medication alerts is crucial to implementing effective alerts that reduce ADEs and make patients safer. We found that switching from a homegrown EHR with strongly tiered interruptive DDI alerting driven by a highly customized knowledge base to a widely used commercial EHR with weakly tiered interruptive DDI alerting driven by a third-party knowledge base without customization resulted in a significant increase in alert burden and decrease in alert acceptance rates. The decrease in acceptance rates cannot be fully explained by the difference between the drug pairs present in each knowledge base since the decrease in acceptance rates is also observed for matched individual drug pairs. Furthermore, the decrease in acceptance rates cannot be neatly explained simply by the alert fatigue associated with the increased alert burden in the new system. Disabling more than 50% of the DDI alerts in the new system only marginally improved acceptance rates. Based on a prior study which showed much larger acceptance rate increases after introducing carefully delineated severity tiers, 36 the loss of strongly differentiated tiering in the new system may also be a driving factor behind the drop in acceptance rates. It is likely that each of these factors plays a role. Organizations creating changes to their DDI alerting interface should monitor the impact on alert burden and acceptance rates. 
